Rational expectations: how important for econometric policy analysis? by Paul A. Anderson
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (Quarterly Review 
1 73 ^ 
g Rt^civto J 
^ ^LIBRARY < 
o* 
Are Interest Rates Too High? (P. i> ^^ ^vv
5 
Rational Expectations: 
How Important for Econometric Policy Analysis? <P. 4) 
Fall 1978 
District Conditions (p. 11) 
ilSS  TlULL Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review vol. 2, no. 4 
This publication primarily presents economic research aimed at 
improving policy making by the Federal Reserve System and other 
governmental authorities. 
Produced in the Research Department. Edited by Arthur J. Rolnick, 
Senior Economist, Kathleen S. Rolfe, Editor/Writer and Visuals 
Specialist, and Alan Struthers, Jr., Editor/Writer. Graphic design by 
Phil Swenson and charts drawn by Mary Steffenhagen, Graphic 
Services Department. 
Address requests for additional copies to the Research Department, 
Federal Reserve Bank, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55480. 
Articles may be reprinted if the source is credited and the Research 
Department is provided with copies of reprints. 
The views expressed herein are those of the authors 
and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. Rational Expectations: 
How Important for Econometric Policy Analysis?* 
Paul A. Anderson 
Economist 
Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Today's econometric models seriously misrepresent 
the effects of different economic policies because 
they assume that these policies can systematically 
fool people. That is the criticism of economists who 
believe in the theory of rational expectations. They 
believe that people form expectations about eco-
nomic conditions rationally, by efficiently using 
all the information available—including information 
about government policies. Thus, people adjust their 
behavior to take account of the likely effects of these 
policies, and any model which assumes people can be 
repeatedly fooled cannot be trusted. 
Some have dismissed this rational expectations 
criticism because they think it assumes people are 
"too smart," have more information than most people 
really do. But the results of our simulation ex-
periment suggest that the criticism should be taken 
seriously. For according to our experiment, standard 
models go too far the other way: they implicitly as-
sume people are too dumb. Our results show that in 
these models people actually take years to catch on 
and react to a more inflationary policy. And only if 
they can be systematically fooled for such a long time 
can government policies significantly lower the un-
employment rate. 
Of course, these results do not imply that the ra-
tional expectations theory is right about how people 
behave. They do, however, illustrate how important 
assumptions about fooling people are to economic 
policy making. If the rational expectations theory is 
right—or simply better than the standard assump-
V 
•Based on "Rational Expectations Forecasts From Nonrational 
Models," forthcoming in the January 1979 Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics., and Research Department Staff Report 19, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis, April 1978. 
tion—then the policy assessments being made by 
today's models are very wrong, and policy makers 
shouldn't be trusting them to help find the best way to 
reach economic policy goals. 
Using Econometric Models 
Evaluating the effects of different economic policies 
with econometric models appears to be a rather 
straightforward procedure. An econometric model is 
simply a system of equations, estimated from past 
experience, which is thought to represent people's 
behavior. As input, the system requires values for 
certain economic variables thought to be determined 
outside the workings of the model, things like inter-
national developments and government policies. As 
output, the system predicts values of certain quan-
tities such as employment and prices under the as-
sumed external (input) conditions. 
Such a model can simulate the effects of different 
government policies on the economy. Then by com-
paring the outcomes of several simulations of differ-
ent policy options, government policy makers should 
be able to choose the best one to accomplish the 
government's objectives. 
Today there are many of these econometric 
models. Their use in forecasting the economy and 
predicting the effects of government policy is widely 
accepted. The models differ considerably in com-
plexity and underlying theories of behavior. Yet re-
garding the effects of certain kinds of policies, they 
seem to reach a level of agreement which is surprising 
(and which, some claim, would be impossible for 
economists themselves to achieve). 
In particular, most, if not all, of the models sup-
port the existence of a substantial trade-off between 
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omy is below full employment, government economic 
stimulus can decrease the unemployment rate dra-
matically and for quite a long time at the cost of slight 
or moderate increases in the inflation rate. The asso-
ciation of higher-than-average inflation with lower-
than-average unemployment is pretty well established 
in the historical data from which all of the models 
were estimated, and simulation experiments almost 
always imply that the government is able to trade 
inflation for unemployment by appropriate policy. 
The Rational Expectations Criticism 
Recently, however, some economists
1 have dissented 
sharply from the consensus, not only doubting the 
possibility of inflation-unemployment "trades" but 
also expressing serious reservations about the general 
usefulness of existing models and policy simulation 
techniques. These economists claim that today's 
models and methods are critically flawed as tools for 
policy analysis because they don't pay enough atten-
tion to people's expectations. To accurately assess 
the effects of different economic policies, they say, a 
far more sophisticated modeling of people's expecta-
tions must be included in the structure of econo-
metric models. The modeling principle they propose 
is based on the theory of rational expectations. 
Most economists agree that expectations are an 
important influence on the current action of eco-
nomic agents—consumers, workers, producers, and 
investors. In the saving and spending decisions of 
households, the wage demands of workers, and the 
production and expansion plans of industry, some 
idea of the future course of prices and other eco-
nomic conditions helps guide people's actions. 
Since the future is so important, the rational 
expectationists argue, people form expectations 
about it rationally. To try to do the best they can for 
themselves, people use all the information they can 
get to form good forecasts of inflation and other 
variables which affect their economic decisions 
today. And because government policy can have 
such a big effect on the future course of the economy, 
information about government policy is an important 
part of the information they pay attention to. When 
government policy changes, therefore, people adjust 
their expectations and actions in line with the likely 
effects of the policy change. 
Rational expectationists argue that today's models 
are, however, ill-equipped to simulate the actual re-
actions of people to policy changes. This is because 
most models are built on the assumption that people 
form their expectations by extrapolating past experi-
ence in a mechanical way. Expectations formed in 
this way are not very sensitive to changes in policy; 
they change very slowly regardless of policy changes. 
So simulations using such models implicitly assume 
that people change their expectations about eco-
nomic conditions—and thus their behavior—very 
slowly even when important government policies have 
obviously changed substantially. In a sense, then, 
these models assume that people can be fooled for 
long periods of time into acting against their own best 
interests. 
While some of the policy implications of today's 
econometric models may not be heavily dependent 
on this assumed irrational behavior, the rational 
expectationists have shown theoretically that the 
existence of a policy trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment depends crucially on it. They have 
designed small, theoretical models of economies 
in which agents form their expectations rationally. 
These models generate a historical correlation be-
tween unemployment and inflation similar to that in 
the U.S. economy. However, government policies 
which decrease unemployment in irrational econo-
metric simulations have no effect on unemployment 
in these theoretical economies. In a world of rational 
expectations, that is, there is no inflation-unemploy-
ment policy trade-off. 
The logic of the rational expectations critique 
has not been challenged, but its basic assumption of 
rationality has. Some economists have argued that 
current models are "good enough" because the real 
world is more complex, less perfect than the theo-
retical world of the rational expectations examples. 
Most people simply are not aware of monetary and 
fiscal policies, and even if they were, such policies 
probably wouldn't change behavior much anyway. 
Therefore, these economists say, there can be a 
'The most prominent of this group are Robert E. Lucas, Jr., of the 
University of Chicago, and Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace, both of 
the University of Minnesota and the Research Department of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Some of their papers on the 
subject are listed at the end of this article. 
5 policy trade-off between inflation and unemploy-
ment. 
But if people are not rational, how irrational are 
they? By how much and for how long can they be 
fooled? And how important is this assumption for 
policy evaluation? 
Evaluating Policies With and Without 
Rational Expectations: An Experiment 
To measure the importance of the rational expecta-
tions assumption, we used an econometric model to 
evaluate the effects of 4 and 8 percent money supply 
growth on inflation and unemployment in the early 
1960s. We simulated the model twice for each money 
growth alternative—once using the model's standard 
assumptions about expectations, then adjusting it to 
reflect rationally formed expectations about in-
flation. 
The econometric model used was developed by 
researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
This model is a convenient one to use here for a 
couple of reasons. It is quite small, and its internal 
structure is easy to understand. More important, the 
St. Louis model contains a specific equation which 
estimates people's expectations of inflation, based on 
the past. This simplifies the task of assessing the ef-
fect of expectations on simulation results and makes 
it easy to insert alternative assumptions about expec-
tations of inflation without altering the rest of the 
structure of the model.
2 
The technique we used to produce informed 
expectations involved a simple change in the model's 
structure. Instead of expectations generated by the 
standard equation, the actual price predictions of the 
model were fed into the equations representing 
people's behavior. That is, what the model said in-
flation would be each quarter was made to equal what 
people expected it would be. Thus, when the effects 
of different policies were simulated, the model's out-
put would represent the movements of the economy 
as if people knew what the probable effects of policy 
would be. People would not have been fooled. 
The results of this experiment indicate that the 
rational expectations theory can have a very large 
quantitative impact on the predicted effects of differ-
ent policies. To see this, compare Charts 1 and 2. 
The standard policy simulations shown in Chart 1 
imply two things. One is that steady monetary ex-
pansion can reduce unemployment substantially. In 
fact, according to these simulations, steady 8 percent 
money growth in the early 1960s could eventually 
have driven the unemployment rate below 1 percent. 
But this would have had to be done at the expense of 
higher inflation, for the other implication is that a 
policy trade-off does exist between inflation and un-
employment. After two years of steady 4 percent 
money growth, the standard St. Louis model says, the 
unemployment rate would have been 4.4 percent and 
the inflation rate 2.3 percent. If money had grown at 8 
percent, the unemployment rate would have fallen to 
2 percent but inflation would have been 4.8 percent. 
The rational expectations simulations shown in 
Chart 2 give a very different picture of the effects of 
monetary expansion. First, it cannot decrease the 
unemployment rate much. The rational expectations 
results indicate that 8 percent money growth in the 
early 1960s could not have driven the unemployment 
rate below even 4.5 percent, much less the 1 percent 
rate of the standard simulations. And inflation would 
have increased much more rapidly than standard 
simulations predict. This means that, according to 
the rational expectations simulations, only a very 
slight policy trade-off between inflation and unem-
ployment exists. And that trade-off is much worse 
than the standard simulations say. Two years of 4 
percent money growth would have resulted in 5.4 
percent unemployment and 5.8 percent inflation; an 
8 percent policy would only have reduced unemploy-
ment to 5 percent at the cost of an 11.8 percent 
inflation rate. If people are not fooled by government 
policies, therefore, the cost (measured in terms of 
inflation) of reducing unemployment by monetary 
growth appear to be much higher than standard simu-
lations predict.
3 
2Even more than these technical considerations, however, the 
intellectual background of the St. Louis model makes it the most 
appropriate vehicle for this rational expectations experiment. The St. 
Louis model was estimated, in part, to embody the theoretical position 
commonly called Monetarism. The Monetarists contend, among other 
things, that there is no policy trade-off between inflation and unemploy-
ment. However, conventional simulations of the St. Louis model have 
implied the existence of a trade-off. In this respect, the model has not 
been consistent with Monetarist theory. With the inclusion of rational 
expectations, the St. Louis model produces simulation results more 
consistent with the Monetarist view. 
3Using the large Federal Reserve-MIT-Penn econometric model 
in this experiment produces similar results. See "Rational Expectations 
Forecasts From Nonrational Models," Journal of Monetary Economics, 
forthcoming January 1979, or Research Department Staff Report 19, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, April 1978. 
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two versions of the St. Louis model are so different 
that in 1960 policy makers might have chosen differ-
ently between the two policies depending on which 
set of simulations they relied on. If they cared about 
both inflation and unemployment but considered 
unemployment a more pressing problem, on the basis 
of the standard simulations they would most likely 
have preferred 8 percent money growth. But if they 
chose on the basis of the rational expectations results, 
they might have preferred the slower 4 percent 
growth, thinking it not worthwhile to generate so 
much inflation just to reduce unemployment by a 
small amount. 











The inflation/unemployment trade-off practically disappears 
when rational expectations are assumed. 
Inflation and unemployment rate simulations of the St. Louis model 
Quarterly 1960:1-1963:4 
Chart 1 Chart 2 
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7 Chart 3 
According to this model, people don't learn from experience. 
Errors in expectations of inflation in standard simulation of the St. Louis model with 8% money growth 
Quarterly, 1960-1963, at annual rates 
% Errors Expectations 
1960 1961 
Source: FRB Minneapolis 
1962  1963 
Fooling People 
Since the rational expectations simulations come 
from a model adjusted to assume people know the 
probable effects of government policies, the large 
difference between the standard and rational expec-
tations simulations is the result of the unadjusted 
St. Louis model assuming people will be fooled about 
the course of inflation. And because this model calcu-
lates an anticipated inflation rate, we can measure 
just how badly it thinks they will be fooled. 
The forecast errors made by agents in the mod-
el's 8 percent money growth simulation are shown in 
Chart 3. These errors are the differences between the 
expectations of inflation computed from the expec-
tation equation in the model and the actual rates of 
inflation predicted by the model. 
The most striking feature of these errors is the 
persistence of underprediction. Obviously the St. 
Louis model assumes people learn very slowly. For 
the last three and a half years of the period shown 
people would expect less inflation than actually oc-
curred. Even though their forecasts were never even 
approximately vindicated by experience, they would 
continue to forecast in the same way. For example, at 
the beginning of 1963, after four quarters of seeing 
actual inflation galloping at a rate more than 3 per-
centage points faster than expected, people would be 
expecting 4.6 percent inflation and would be sur-
prised when actual inflation of 7.9 percent resulted. 
That is, the model assumes they would be fooled by 




Implausible as that may sound, so far there is little 
empirical evidence to determine whether people 
4The large and persistent errors in Chart 3 are not because the 
expectation equation of the St. Louis model fits historical data poorly. 
In fact, a simulation analyzing the effects of a money growth rate of 
2 percent (the actual average for the period) shows that the equation 
makes only very small errors in predicting inflation. The errors in that 
simulation were all less than 0.4 percent. 
The problem is that when simulating the effects of a policy which 
is much different from experience, economists must choose. They can 
assume (as standard simulation techniques do) that people will stick to 
the same forecast rules as before and thus accept high, persistent 
forecast errors. Or they can assume (as the rational expectations tech-
nique does) that people's forecast errors will remain roughly the same 
as before and they will adjust whatever forecast rules they use in a 
roughly correct way. 
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dence there is suggests they can't). As the results of 
our experiment illustrate, however, whether they can 
or not is very important for the use of econometric 
models in policy making. For if the rational expecta-
tions theory is right and people cannot be systemati-
cally fooled, policy makers using current models are 
being seriously misled about the effects of at least 
some of the government policies they're considering. 
The conclusions of these models must be approached 
cautiously, therefore, until we know more about how 
people form and change expectations. 
The importance of the rational expectations 
theory goes beyond that, though. For even if it is 
wrong, and government policies can systematically 
fool people, should they? Rational expectations thus 
poses a fresh challenge for economists: to design 
policies which are effective without having to fool 
people. 
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